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Abstract 
In a developing economy such as Nigeria’s, financial markets lack the capacity to meet the financial 
requirements of business firms. Firms utilize loans, leases and other interest-bearing financial obligations as 
sources of debt financing. Consequent upon the foregoing, we analyze the determinants of financial structure of 
Nigerian quoted firms during the period spanning 1999-2012. The study adopted two theoretical frameworks: 
Pecking order and Static Trade-off Theories captured  in a panel regression model. A sample of 25 firms was 
selected based on data quality and availability to address the requirements of the variables in the regression 
model. The results of the regression indicate that profitability, tangibility, volatility (operating risk), growth 
opportunities and firm size are important factors influencing the choice of financial mix among Nigerian firms. 
Our findings are corroborative of theoretical predictions and empirical evidence. Therefore, we provide useful 
recommendations for leverage decisions for managers of Nigerian firms and the management of the Nigerian 
stock market. 
Keywords: determinants, financial structure, capital structure, Nigerian firms, pecking order and static trade - 
off theories. 
 
1. Introduction 
The capital of any business firm is the foundation upon which the business operates. 
It absorbs costs and losses, multiplies fixed assets and in all, enhances growth through mergers and 
acquisitions. In some countries, governments often provide financial assistance to business firms to enable them 
kick-start and sustain their operations and overcome teething problems. Such assistance may take pre-eminence 
during economic recession which is often characterized by low demand for goods and services occasioned by 
low level of income; falling gross domestic product (GDP); business failure and loss of jobs. The reasons for 
governments’ policy direction are legion: to prevent corporate failure and its contagious effects on the economy; 
maintain a desired level of employment and price stability and above all, encourage entrepreneurial 
development. 
Studying the capital composition of firms in developing countries like Nigeria will enable financial managers, 
the governments and other stakeholders incorporate sectors prevent  corporate failure, hence its attendant 
consequences  on the economy. 
According to Owolabi and Inyang (2012), developing countries such as Nigeria often times grapple 
with the twin problems of a weak and political instability. This has direct effect on foreign investments a major 
source of capital for Nigerian firms. 
Dagogo and Ollor (2009), observed that the failure of previous financial policies of government to 
achieve desirable economic growth was a concern that demands restructuring of the Nigerian system, especially 
in the glare of an ailing economy. Thus, the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1986 
and the privatisation programme in 1989 were in response to failed institutional measures to promote growth in 
the industrial sector. Uche (2000), was of the view thatt SAP was designed to achieve balance of payment 
viability by altering and restructuring the production and consumption patterns of the economy, eliminating price 
distortions, reducing the heavy dependence on consumer goods, imports and crude oil exports, enhancing the 
non-oil export base, rationalising the role of the public sector, accelerating the growth potential of the private 
sector and achieving sustainable growth. To achieve these objectives, the main strategies of the programme were 
the adoption of a market exchange rate for the Naira, the deregulation of external trade and balance of payment 
arrangements, reduction in the price and administrative control and more reliance on market forces as a major 
determinant of economic activity. In the same vein, Ojo (1991) pointed out that government’s reasons for 
deregulation of the economy were legion: stagnant growth, rising inflation, unemployment, food shortage and 
mounting external debt. 
Nevertheless business firms are catalysts operating in the corporate sector which is the engine room of 
growth and development in an economy.  
 Abor (2008) observed that corporate sector growth is vital to economic development. Therefore, it is 
imperative for firms in developing countries to be able to finance their activities and grow overtime if they are 
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ever to play an increasing and prominent role in proving employment as well as income in terms of profits, 
dividends and wages/salaries to households. Firms earn economic gains of rents from strategic assets provide a 
firm with as ource of steady stream of rents so that it gains a sustained competitive advantage over its rivals. 
Thus, it is the stock of a strategic asset that is important in determining a firm’s profitability level (Kochair, 
1997). 
According to William (1991), the financing structures of debt and equity can be compared with respect 
to the characteristics of control and property rights. The debt instrument carries fixed rules and conventions that 
usually monitor the lending process. The repayment schedule of the principal loan amount and the interest 
payment are stipulated in the contract with debt holders having primary claim over the firm’s cash flows from 
the assets. The firm is often required to meet liquidity tests to ensure that lender’s investment is not in jeopardy. 
Equity owners on the other hand, have a residual claimant status over the cash flows from assets earnings and 
liquidation (William, 1991). Therefore, debt increases creditor’s claims and equity increases when a firm issues 
shares to raise capital or pay dividends in form of bonus shares. On the other hand, the creditor’s claims increase 
when a firm borrows on both short and long terms. 
The aim of determining financial structure is to distinguish structure of financial fund in order to 
minimize shareholders’ wealth (Akparpour and Aghabeygzadeh, 2011). 
The decisio to combine equity, long-term and short-term debts as the capital mix is called financial 
structure. When financing their activities, firms, especially those with limited liabilities, combine debt and 
equity. Equity capital includes common and preference shares while debt includes such instruments as long-term 
loan stock, mortgage and debenture bonds. The combination of long-term interest bearing obligations and equity 
is referred to as capital structure. This work is not centered on capital structure decision. However, attempts have 
been made to explain the concept – capital structure. It refers to the mix of long-term sources of funds, such as 
debentures, long-term debts, preference share capital and equity share capital including reserves and surpluses 
(i.e. retained earnings) [Pandey, 2000]. Teker et al (2009) explained that the capital structure of a company 
consists of a particular combination of debt and equity issues to relieve potential pressures on its long-term 
financing. To examine such issues, many theories have been developed in the literature and they generally focus 
upon what determinants are likely to influence the so-called leverage decisions of the firms. Among these, the 
Modigliani and Miller (MM) theory, trade-off theory, pecking order theory or signally theory have been said to 
mainly play a crucial role in identifying and testing the various properties of the leverage decisions (Teker, et al 
2009). 
Pandey (2000) argued that it is being increasingly realized that a company should plan its capital 
structure to minimise the use of the funds in order to adapt more easily to the changing macroeconomic 
conditions surrounding businesses. 
In the developing economies such as Nigeria, financial structure decisions are taken based on the level 
of development of the domestic markets. Amjed (2008) observed that financial markets are complete almost 
perfect in developed counties. Therefore, parameters for making financial structure decisions are mainly the cost 
benefits of a particular source of financing these countries. Whereas in developing countries, financial markets 
are not fully capable of meeting the financial needs of the corporate sector. Non conventional securities 
particularly debt securities are not warmly welcomed by the markets. Therefore, firms rely on the commercial 
bank loans and lease financing as source of debt. 
With this challenge, the firms in developing economies have to balance their capital structure in such a 
way that short term sources of financing are inclusive. 
Financial structure decisions are one of the most contentious areas in corporate finance. The issue in 
contention revolves around the optimal financial mix. There are two schools of thought in this regard. One 
school of thought called the traditional theory advocates for optimal financial structure and the other opposes it.  
The former school argues that judicious use of debt and equity capital can maximise the value of the firm. The 
latter school of thought led by Modigliani and Miller (1958) contended that financing decision does not affect 
the value of the firm because the value of the firm depends on the underlying profitability and investment risk. 
That is, under the perfect capital market assumption of no bankruptcy cost and frictionless capital markets; if no 
taxes, the firm’s value is independent of the financial structure.  
In developing countries such as Nigeria, financing decisions are taken based on the level of 
development of the domestic markets.  
Firms in developing countries rely on commercial bank loans and lease financing as major sources of debt. 
Therefore, this paper analyses the determinants of financial structure, taking into cognisance the peculiarities of 
the under developed Nigerian financial market..  
 
2.0  Review of Related Literature 
2.1 Capital /financial Structure: Conceptual Definition  
The combination of debt and equity in financing a firm’s operation is called capital structure. According to 
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Pandey (2000) capital structure refers to the mix of long-term sources of funds, such as debentures, long-term 
debts, preference share capital and equity share capital  including reserves and surpluses (i.e. retained earnings). 
In the words of Abor (2008) capital structure is defined as the specific mix of debt and equity a firm uses to 
finance its operations. 
Teker et al (2009) explained that the capital structure of a company consists of a particular 
combination of debt and equity issues to relieve potential pressures on its long term financing. 
A firm’s capital structure refers to the mix of its financial liabilities (Kochhar, 1997). It refers to a 
mixture of a variety of long term sources of funds and equity shares including reserves and surpluses of an 
enterprise (Pratheepkparth, 2011).  Chou and Lee (2010) explained that capital structure includes mixture of debt 
and equity financing. Whether or not an optimal capital structure exists in one of the most important and 
complex issues in corporate finance. 
Financial structure on the other hand is the use of long-term and short-term debts and equity in 
financing a firm’s activity.  Firms have choices to raise their capital by various means including internally 
generated fund, new equity issue or various types of debts. The decision to select sources of finance is referred to 
as financial structure decision. 
A process which leads to final decision is called financial structure determining methods. Methods of 
determining financial structure should be chosen with particular attention to the main features of securities 
influenced by internal factors within the firm or other external factors (Esfahani, 2006). 
 
2.2 Theories of Capital Structure 
Capital structure decision can affect the value of the firm either by changing the expected earnings or the cost of 
capital or both. Leverage cannot change the total expected earnings of the firm, but it can affect the residue 
earnings of the shareholder. The effect of leverage on the cost of capital is not very clear. Conflicting opinions 
have been expressed on this issue (Pandey, 2000). 
In the words of Kochhar (1997) “the financing decision –mix of debt and equity – represents a 
fundamental issue faced by financial managers of a firm. The study of capital structure has traditionally been 
carried out by finance researchers.  
Modigliani and Miller were the first to raise the question of the relevance of capital structure of a firm 
(Robins, 1992). 
Chou and Lee (2010) observed that the theory of capital structure originated from the path breaking 
contribution of Modigliani and Miller in 1958; under the perfect capital market assumption that if there is no 
bankruptcy cost and capital markets are frictionless if without taxes, the firm’s value is independent of the 
capital structure. This is known as M-M Proposition I. in 1967, under considering the corporate taxes, 
Modigliani and Miller modified the conclusion to recognise tax shield, because debt can reduce the tax to pay, so 
the best capital structure of enterprises should be 100% of debt. But this is unreasonable in the real world (Chou 
and Lee, 2010). 
The existence of an optimum capital structure is not accepted by all. There exists two extreme views 
and a middle position (Pandey, 2000). 
2.2.1 The Modigliani – Miller Hypotheses 
In their path-breaking paper in 1958 Nobel Laureates, Merton Miller and Franco Modigliani provided the formal 
proof of the famous M&M irrelevance theory.  They argued that under a perfect capital market a firm’s market 
value is independent of  the capital structure.  The underlying rationale for the Modigliani-Miller theory is that 
the value of the firm is determined solely by the left hand side of the balance sheet which reflects the company’s 
investments policy (Drobez and Fix, 2003). The theory suggests that the value of the firm tends to be 
independent of the debt balance of the company and instead, it is mainly affected by the presence of a number of 
project investments with positive not present value. 
Modigliani-Miller (1958)  assumes that investors have the same financial information about a firm 
with that of the managers, which can be referral to as systematic informatics but in practice, it is more 
convenient to assume that manager are likely to have insider information which is simply called asymmetric 
information (Teker, et al, 2009). Myers and Majiluf (1984) confirmed that mangers of form have superior 
information about the actual value of the firms. 
2.2.2 Trade-Off Theory 
This theory holds that a firm’s capital composition of debt and equity is determined by taxes and costs of 
financial distress. Interest payment has benefits since it is tax deductible.  
Wolfgang and Roger (2003) pointed out that the trade-off theory of the capital structure suggests that a 
firm’s target leverage is driven by three competing forces of taxes, costs of financial distress (bankruptcy costs), 
and agency conflicts. Adding debt to a firm’s capital structure lowers its (corporate) tax liability and increase the 
after tax cash flow available to the provider of capital. Thus, there is a positive relationship between the 
(corporate) tax shield and the value of the firm. 
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Gupta et al (2010) suggested that the firm’s optimal capital structure will involve the trade-off among 
the effects of corporate and personal taxes, bankruptcy costs, agency costs, etc. agency costs arose from 
separation of ownership and control and conflicts of interest between categories of agents. One of the problems 
that cause conflict between managers and shareholders is free cash flows. 
2.2.3 Pecking Order Theory 
The major prediction of Pecking Order theory according to Adesola (2009), is that firms will not have a target 
optimal capital structure, but will instead follow a pecking order of incremental financing choices that places 
internally generated funds at the top of the order, followed by debt issues and finally when the firm reach its debt 
capacity. Therefore, this theory holds that a firm will finance its operation following a sequence of internally 
generated funds (retained earnings), debt financing and equity issue. 
In the words of Welch (2006), overtime, the pecking order has acquired an identification with a 
number of related phenomena. 
Consequently, these phenomena include; 
- The Pecking Order: the preference to find new projects with more senior claims. 
- Averse Selection: the fact that insiders know more than potential new investors. 
- Financial Slack: An internal cash reserve that firms can top. 
- The Financing Pyramid: capital structure that contains more senior than junior claims. A pecking 
order can arise in any trade-off theory in which issuing junior claims is more expensive than issue 
senior claims. It can be introduced not only through adverse selection costs to equity (the traditional 
method), but also through agency costs to equity (Morellec, 2004). 
 
2.3  The Determinants of Capital/financial  Structure  
The capital structure of affirm is determined by internal and external factors. The external factors are the macro 
economic variables which include tax policy of government, inflation rate and capital market condition. The 
characteristics of an individual firm, which termed microeconomic factors, include size of a firm, growth rate, 
profitability, debt servicing capacity and operating leverage [Baral, 2004]. Teker, et al (2009) identified the 
determinants of capital structure of firms to include tangibility, size, growth opportunities, profitability and non-
debt tax shields. 
The determination of capital structure in practice according to Pandey (2000) involves additional 
considerations in addition to the concerns about EPS – earnings per share, value and cash fow attitude of 
managers with regards to financing decisions are quite often influenced by their desire, not to lose control, to 
maintain operating flexibility and to have convenient and cheap means of raising funds. He argued that the most 
important considerations are: concern for dilution of control; desire to maintain operating flexibility; ease of 
marketing capital inexpensively; capacity for economies of scale; and agency costs. 
Abor (2008) in his study of the determinants of the capital structure of Ghanaian firms identified the 
following factors to be responsible for leverage decisions among Ghanaian firms (both quoted are unquoted 
firms): age of the firm, size of the firm, asset structure, profitability, growth opportunities, dividends anticipated, 
risk, tax benefit and managerial ownership. These factors influence both long-term and short-term leverage 
ratios. In a pooled regression analysis Wolfgang and Roger (2003) identified tangibility, size, growth, 
profitability, volatility, non-debt tax shield and uniqueness as the major determinants of capital structure. 
Similarly, Harris and Raviv (1992) summarised the results of central papers on theory capital structure.  After the 
famous work Modigliani and Miller in 50,s, a great number of capital structures have been conducted in a wide 
variety of countries. These studies according to Güven et al (2006) concentrated on factors such as volatility, 
bankruptcy probability, fixed assets, non-debt tax shields, profitability, growth opportunities, size, and free cost 
flows. 
Beven and Denbolt (2004) tested the inconsistency of the determinants of capital structure in British 
firms, comparing the results of a pooled OLS regression with the results of application of models considering 
fixed non-observable individual effects. The authors, using as determinants of various types of debt according to 
its maturity and origin, size, level of security, profitability and opportunity for growth. 
 
2.4 Empirical Review of the Determinants of Capital/Financial Structures 
In this selection, the results of previous research and the associated theoretical models are x-rayed to give the 
reader an insight. Following these theoretical standpoints, a number of empirical studies have identified firm-
level characteristics that affect the capital structure of firms. Among these characteristics are age of the firm, 
asset  structure, profitability, growth, firm risk, tax and ownership structure (Abor, 2008). Since these factors 
according to Harris and Raviv (1991) cause leverage to increase, we shall discuss them in turn. 
• Age of the firm 
Age of the firm is a standard measure of reputation in capital structure models. As a firm continues longer in 
business it establishes itself as an ongoing business, it establishes itself as an ongoing business and therefore 
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increases its capacity to take on more debt; hence age is positively related to debt. Before granting a loan, 
banks tend to evaluate the credit worthiness of entrepreneurs as these are generally believed to pin high 
hopes on very risky projects promising high profitability rates (Abor, 2008). Highly indebted companies 
appear to be gambling with their creditors’ money. If the investment for which credit is sought is profitable, 
shareholders will collect a significant share of the earnings, but if the project fails, then the creditors have to 
bear the consequences (Myers, 1977). Hall et al (2004) agreed that age is positively related to long-term 
debt but negatively related to short-term debt. Baral (2004) found positive and significant correlation 
between capital structure and age of firm. Esperanca et al (2003), however, found that age is negatively 
related to both long-term and short-term debt. Green, Murinde and Suppakitjarak (2002) also found that age 
has a negative influence on the probability of incurring debt in the initial capital equation, and no impact in 
the additional capital equation. 
Consider Abor (2008) equations which borrow extensively from the above models:  yit = α +βxit + eit......(1) 
where subscript i denotes the cross-sectional dimension and t represents the time-series dimension. The left-
hand variable, yit, represents the dependent variable in the model, which is the debt ratio of the firm. xit 
contains the set of explanatory variable in the estimation model, α is the constant and β represents the 
coefficients, hence the slope and the intercept respectively. 
• Size 
The effect of size on leverage according to Wolfgang and Roger (2003) is ambiguous. They argued that 
according to the trade-off theory, an inverse relationship exist between size and probability of bankruptcy, 
i.e. a positive relationship between size and leverage. Titman and Wessel (1988) measured size as the 
natural logarithm of net sales. The logarithmic transformation accounts for the conjecture that small firms 
are particularly affected by a size effect. 
It is generally believed that there are economies of scale in bankruptcy costs: larger firms face lower limit 
costs of bankruptcy than smaller firms, as shown in Prasad et al (2001). Baral (200) established a strong 
correlation between capital structure and size of a firm. 
Cosh and Hughes (1994) added that if operational risk is inversely related to firm size, this should rather 
predispose smaller firms to be relatively less debt. 
Empirical evidence or the relationship between size and capital structure supports a positive relationship. 
Several works show a positive relationship between firm size and leverage. See for instance, Barclay and 
Smith (1996). Cassar and Holmes (2003), Esperance et al (2003), and Hall et al (2004) found a positive 
relationship between firm size and long-term debt ratio, but a negative relationship between firm size and 
short-term debt ratio. Some studies also support a negative relationship between size and short-term debt 
ratio, example, Michaelsd et al (1999) and Chilterden et al (1996) 
• Tangibility 
This is also referred to as asset structure. Abor (2008) found a negative correlation between asset structure 
and capital structure. He argued that the asset structure of a firm plays a significant role in determining its 
capital structure. The degree to which the firm’s assets are tangible should result in the firm having greater 
liquidation value (Harris and Raviv, 1991). Empirical evidence suggests a positive relationship consistent 
with theoretical argument between asset structure and leverage for the firms. (Styam-Sunder and Myers, 
1999 and Hovakimian et al, 2000) other studies specifically suggest a positive relationship between asset 
structure and both long-term and short-term debt. See for example, Jordan et al, 1998; Micheals et al, 1999; 
Cassar and Holmes, 2003; Hall et al, 2004). Esperance et al (2003) found positive relationships between 
asset structure and both long-term and short-term debt. Teker et al (2009) found that the return on assets and 
tangibility of assets have a positive and statistically significant impact on the firm’s leverage ratio. 
Positive relation between tangibility and leverage is also found in Deesomsak et al (2004), Aktar (2005), 
Supanvanij (2006) and Aktar and Oliver (2009). 
• Profitability 
In this trade-off theory, agency costs, faxes and bankruptcy push more profitable firms towards higher book 
leverage. First, expected bankruptcy cost decline when profitability increases. Second, the deductibility of 
corporate interest payments induces more profitable firms to finance with debt (Wolfgang and Roger, 2003). 
The relationship between firm profitability capital structures can be explained by the Pecking Order theory 
(POT) discussed above, which holds that firms prefer internal sources of finance to external sources. The 
order of the preference is from the one that is least sensitive (and least risky to the one that is most sensitive 
(and most risky). That arises because of asymmetric information between corporate insiders and less well-
informed market participants (Meyers, 1984). 
Several empirical evidence from previous studies corroborates the Pecking order theory. Most studies found 
a negative relationship between profitability and capital structure. (See Shyam –Sunder and Myers, 1999; 
Mishra and McConaughy 1999; Michaelas et al 1999). Cabar and Holmes (2003), Esperance et al (2003), 
and Hall et al (2004) also suggested negative relationship between profitability and both long-term debt and 
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short-term debt ratios. Peterson and Rajan (1994), however, found a significantly positive association 
between profitability and debt ratio. 
• Growth Opportunities 
The predictions for book leverage carry over to market leverage is evident in Fama and French (2000). The 
trade-off theory predicts a negative relationship between leverage and investment opportunities. Since the 
market grows at least in proportion with investment outlays the relationship between growth opportunities 
and market leverage is also negative (Wolfgang and Roger, 2003). 
Growth is likely to occur with greater demand on literally generated funds and push the firm into borrowing 
(Hall et al, 2004). In the case of small firms with more concentrated ownership, it is expected that high 
growth firms will require more external financing ad should display higher leverage (Heshmati, 2001). Baral 
(2004) found that capital structures and growth opportunities are positively correlated. 
Some scholars as well as researchers found positive relationships between sales growth and leverage (see 
Titman and Wessel, 1988 and Barton et al, 1989). 
Other evidence suggests that higher growth firms use less debt (see Roden and Lewellen, 1995 and Al-
sakran, 2001). Michaelas et al (1999) found future growth to be positively related to leverage and long-term 
debt. Cassar and Holmes (2003) and Hall et al (2004) showed positive associations between growth and 
both long-term debt and short-term debt ratios, while Chitterden et al (1996), Jordan et al (1992), and 
Esperance et al (2003) found mixed evidence. However, Teker et al (2009) found that profit margin on sales 
a representing growth opportunity have some negative and significant impacts of firms’ leverage degree. 
• Firm Risk 
In some works, firm risk is regarded as volatility. This variable measures risks as the variability in earnings 
and cash flows. Bradley et al (1984) measured variability as the standard deviation of the first difference in 
annual earnings, scaled by the averaged value of the firm’s total assets overtime. 
Higher volatility of earnings increases the probability of financial distress since firms may not have enough 
revenue to fulfil their debt obligations. This suggest a negative relation between volatility and leverage as 
indicated in Alker and Oliver (2009), Banchuenijit (2010) found a positive relation between leverage and 
volatility. 
The level of risk is said to be one of the determinants of a firm’s capital structure (kale et al, 1991). Despite 
the broad consensus that firm risk is an important determinant of corporate debt policy, empirical 
investigation has led to contradictory results (Agbor, 2008). A number  of studies have indicated on inverse 
relationship between risk and debt ratio (see Kale et al, 1991) and kim et al, 1998). Other studies suggest a 
positive relationship (Jordan et al , 1998, Michaelas et al, 1999). Esperanca et al (2003) also found positive 
associations between firm risk and both long-term and short-term debt. 
• Taxation 
Many empirical studies have identified the impact of taxation on corporate leverage decisions. In Ghanaian 
firms, Abor (2008) found that taxes have a statistically significant positive relationship to short-term debt 
ratio among SMEs. This suggests that SMEs in the high tax rates rely more on short term debt. He also 
reported assignment and negative relationship between tax and long-term debt ratios of quoted firms. The 
relationship could be attributable to the special tax rebate for quoted firms. Firms that go public tend to 
enjoy tax reduction compared to unquoted firms. 
Graham (1999) concludes that in general, taxes do affect corporate financial decisions, but the magnitude of 
the effect is mostly not large. However, de Angelo and Masulis (1980) showed that there are other 
alternative tax shield such as depreciation, research and development expenses, investment deductions, etc, 
that could substitute fiscal role of debt. Empirically, this substitution effect is difficult to measure, as finding 
an accurate proxy for tax reduction that excludes the effect of economic depreciation and expenses is tedious 
(Titman and Wessels, 1998). 
 
3.0   Methodology 
The study utilized pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regression which provided an unbiased 
estimation of the linear relationship among the variables. The panel data pooled observations on a cross-section 
of units over several time periods. The model of the determinants of financial structure combines the usual 
Static-Trade-off Theory and Pecking Order Theory which are deeply rooted in Modigliani and Miller (1958) and 
(1963). The empirical investigation of the determinants of financial structure in Nigeria sampled firms quoted on 
the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) during the period 1999-2012. Secondary data were collated from the annual 
reports and statement of accounts of the affected firms. A total of 157 firms constituted the population. A sample 
of 25 firms was selected based on data quality and availability to address the variables specified in the model. 
Description of Research Variables 
FSRit = Financial Leverage  ratio i.e.  for firm I in term t  
TANit  = This is the asset structure derived as  tangible fixed assets divided by total assets for firm i in 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.5, No.16, 2014 
 
59 
time t  
GRWit =  The rate of growth in sales also called growth opportunities for firm i in time t.  This variable 
is also measured as growth rate in fixed assets over time.  
PRit=   Profitability expressed as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to total assets 
for firm i in time t.  
OPR =  Operating Risk (volatility), this is a measure of variation in profits or earnings. 
FS   =   The size of the firm (log of total assets) for firm i    in time t. 
ei    =        Stochastic error term 
αo ,α1, α2,…… α6 = Regression parameters 
 
3.5 Theoretical Model of the Determinants of Financial Structure  
Our model followed the footsteps of modern researchers who combined Static Trade-off Theory (STT) and 
Pecking Order Theory (POT). See for example 
Cassar and Holmes (2003), Esperance et al (2003),Wolfgang and Roger (2003), Hall et al (2004), Abor (2008), 
Teker et al (2009) , Baral (2004), Bas et al (2010), Bartholdy and Mateus (2008), Bas et al (2009), 
Amjed(2010), Akbarpour and Aghabeygzadeh (2011) and Zoppa and McMahon (2009).  
Thus,  FSR = f(PR, TAN, GRW, OPR, FS). 
Hence, FSRit = a0 + a1PRit 1+ α2TANit 2 + a3GRWit3 + α4OPR t4 + α5FS t5 + ei 
.
Where FSR = Financial structure ratio (Financial structure) 
   PR = Profitability 
 TAN = Tangibility of assets 
GRW = Growth opportunities 
OPR = Operating risk called volatility 
FS = Size of firm in the industry 
 
4.0  Results and Discussions 
Regression results 
Dependent Variable: FSR 
Method: Ordinary Least Squares (Pooled data) 
 
Sample: 1999 2012 
Included observations: 1984 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 
TAN 
TAN(-1) 
TAN(-2) 
-0.532622 
0.554688 
0.041578 
-1.094562 
1.843211 
0.788843 
0.982314 
1.990021 
2.314591 
-3.703166 
2.156722 
1.998212 
0.0012 
0.0049 
0.0723 
0.1517 
PRE 
PRE(-1) 
PRE(-2) 
-0.709768 
0.258919 
2.221834 
3.080587 
0.783462 
1.903400 
2.230400 
1.023491 
0.979605 
0.0029 
0.2347 
0.8763 
GRW 
GRW(-1) 
GRW(-2) 
-1.033170 
4.098122 
5.908213 
2.437902 
0.657981 
3.907809 
-0.423795 
3.089047 
0.871234 
0.6833 
0.0008 
1.0976 
OPR 
OPR(-1) 
OPR(-2) 
-1.083182 
-0.435671 
-0.019376 
1.249827 
0.321761 
0.937809 
-0.866666 
4.319233 
2.998048 
0.4086 
0.0783 
0.0005 
FST 
FST(-1) 
FST(-2) 
0.194611 
0.342172 
1.812579 
0.113908 
1.191132 
2.008567 
1.708491 
4.765006 
3.412321 
0.1217 
0.0072 
0.1354 
R-squared 0.889957     Mean dependent var 1989.204 
Adjusted R-squared 0.758951     S.D. dependent var 16.18013 
S.E. of regression 16.72865 Akaike info criterion 8.744576 
Sum squared resid 2518.630     Schwarz criterion 8.972811 
Log likelihood 
F-Statistic 
-56.21203 
65.98318 
    Durbin-Watson stat 
Prob(F-Statistic) 
 
1.869939 
0.000031 
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Tangibility 
There is a positive and significant relationship between tangibility of the firms in our analysis and their financial 
structure. The result shows that a one percentage point increase or appreciation in the tangibility of the firms 
improves financial structure by 0.55 percentage points in the current year. When tangibility improves by one 
percent, it brings a 0.041 percentage improvement in the first year lag period and a deterioration of 1.09 percent 
in the second year lag period. In both periods, there is a strong relationship between the variables (t-statistic of 
2.15 and 1.99 respectively).This implies that there is a strong positive relationship between the asset position of 
the firms under study and the financial position. The greater the asset in the firms employ, the stronger will be its 
financial state given that other things are held constant. This is line with our a priori expectation and most 
reported empirical literature and theories such as Agency and Trade-off theories. 
Profitability 
Our result shows that there is a negative relationship between current year profitability and the financial structure 
of the firms and this relationship is statistically significant (t value of 3.08). From the above table, a one 
percentage point decrease in profitability results in a 0.70 percentage deterioration of the financial structure of 
the firm. However, in the first and second year lag periods, there exists a positive and insignificant relationship 
between profitability and financial structure (t-values of 1.02 and 0.97 respectively). The results shows that 
profitability in the current period conforms to the pecking order and Trade-off theories while the positive 
relationship between the variables in the first and second year lag periods validates the dilution of ownership 
structure theory. 
Growth opportunities  
There exists a negative relationship between the rate of growth of sales in the current year and financial structure 
and this relationship is statistically insignificant while in the first and second year lag periods, the relationship is 
positive. However while the relationship is significant in the first year lag period (t= 3.09), it is insignificant in 
the second year lag period (t= 0.87). A one percentage point increase in the rate of growth of sales of the firms 
under study results in 1.03 percentage deterioration in the financial structure in the current period. This trend is 
however reversed in the lag period as a one percentage point increase in the rate of growth of sales results in 4.09 
and 5.90 percentage increases in the financial structure of the firm in the first and second year lags. This implies 
that an increase in the growth rate of sales improves financial structure of firms in our analysis but the positive 
change has to take at least two years to be effective. The result in the current period conforms to our expected 
theoretic expectation even though we cannot say for sure that this relation would hold for certain given the 
insignificant statistical relationship 
Operating risk (volatility) 
There is a negative relationship between operating risk and financial structure in the current, first and second 
year lag periods however while this relationship is insignificant in the current year (t = 0.87), it is significant in 
the first and second year lag periods (t = 4.32 and 2.99 respectively). From the results, a one percentage point 
increase in volatility brings about a 1.08 decrease in the financial structure of the firm in the current year, a 0.44 
percentage decline in the first year lag and a 0.02 percentage decline in the second year lag period. This shows 
that volatility has a harmful effect on the financial structure of firms as shown in the result. 
Firm size 
The FST which is firm size has a positive relationship with financial structure in the current, first and second 
year lag period, however while there is insignificant relationship in the current year (t = 1.708), there is a 
statistically significant relationship in the first and second year lag periods (t = 4.77 and 3.44 respectively). A 
one percentage point increase in firm size brings about a 0.19, 0.34 and 1.82 percentage improvement in the 
financial structure of the firm. The result supports our expected theoretic expectation and is in consonance with 
most results as reported in the literature. This means that the larger the firm size, the more formidable the 
financial structure of that firm and vice versa. 
Adjusted R-squared 
The co-efficient of multiple determinations which is the R2adjusted is 0.75. This means that the regression model 
captures as much as 75% of the total variation in financial structure. Tangibility, profitability, rate of growth of 
sales, volatility and firm size account for 75% change in financial structure and this shows a good fit between 
these variables and financial structure.  
F-statistics  
The F-statistic which is the joint test of significance of all the parameter estimates shows that it is significant at 
both the five percent and one percent levels i.e calculated (65.98) is greater than tabulated. This implication of 
this is that the R2 is statistically significant and the population from which the samples are drawn do differ 
significantly.  
Durbin Watson test 
The Durbin Watson statistic also show that we are justified in carrying out a test of significance and our results 
are reliable since the result show that there is no autocorrelation (with a DW of 1.8). 
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Profitability had a negative and no significant impact on financial structure (coefficient = 0.71, t= 
2.23). This result is in line with empirical evidence in finance literature. For instance, Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 
1999;  Mistra and McConaughty, 1999; Michaelas etc 1999; Cabar and Holmes, 2003; Esperance et al, 2003; 
and Hall et al, 2004 also suggested negative relationship between profitability and both long-term debt and short 
term debt ratios. However, Peterson and Rajan (1994), found a significantly positive association between 
profitability and debt ratio. Several empirical evidence from previous studies corroborates the Pecking Order 
theory. 
Tangibility had a positive and significant correlation with financial structure. Abor(2008) found a 
negative correlation between asset structure and capital structure. The author argued that asset structure of a firm 
plays a significant role in determining its capital structure. 
Most empirical evidence suggests a positive relationship consistent with theoretical argument between 
asset structure and leverage for the firms (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999 and Hovakimian et al, 2000). Other 
studies specifically suggest a positive relationship between asset structure and both long-term and short term 
debt. See also for example, Jordan et al, 1998; Michaels et al, 1999; Cassar and Holmes, 2003; Hall et al, 2004. 
Positive relationship between tangibility and leverage is also found in Deesoomsak et al (2004), Aktar (2005), 
Supanvanij (2006) and Aktar and Oliver (2009). 
Growth opportunities had a negative and no significant relationship with financial structure. The trade-
off theory predicts a negative relationship between leverage and investment opportunities. Since the market 
grows atleast in proportion with investment outlays the relationship between growth opportunities and market 
leverage is also negative  (Wolfgang and Roger, 2003). 
Growth is likely to occur with greater demand on literally generated funds and push the firm into 
borrowing (Hall et al, 2004). In the case of small firms with more concentrated ownership, it is expected that 
high growth firms will require more external financing and should display higher leverage (Heshmati, 2001). 
Baral (2004) found that capital structures and growth opportunities are positively correlated. 
Cassar and Holmes (2003) and Hall et al (2004) showed positive associations between growth and 
both long-term debt and short-term debt ratios. 
Operating risk (volatility) had a negative relationship with financial structure, higher volatility of 
earnings increases the probability of financial distress since firms may not have enough revenue to fulfil their 
debt obligations. This suggests a negative relationship between volatility and leverage as indicated in Alker and 
Oliver (2009), Banchuenijit (2010) found a positive relationship between leverage and volatility. 
The level of risk is said to be one of the determinants of a firm’s capital structure (Kale et al, 1991). 
Despite the broad consensus that firm risk is an important determinant of corporate debt policy, empirical 
investigation has led to contradictory results (Agbor, 2008). A number of studies have indicated on inverse 
relationship between risk and debt ratio (see Kale et al, 1991 and Kim et al, 1998). Other studies suggest a 
positive relationship (Jordan et al, 1998, Michaels et al, 1999). 
Esperanca et al (2003) also found positive associations between firm risk and both long-term and 
short-term debt. 
Firm size had a positive and significant correlation with financial structure. The effect of size on 
leverage according to Wolfgang and Roger (2003) is ambiguous. They argued that according to the trade-off-
theory, an inverse relationship exist between size and probability of bankruptcy that is a positive relationship 
between size and leverage. 
Empirical evidence on the relationship between size and capital structure supports a positive firm size   
and leverage. See for instance, Barday and Smith (1996), Cassar and Holmes (2003), Esperance et al (2003) and 
Hall et al (2004) found a positive relationship between firm size and long-term debt ratio, but a negative 
relationship between firm size and short-term debt ratio. 
 
5.0 Conclusion and Recommendations  
Determinants of financial structure among Nigerian firms provide empirical evidence to support existing theories 
and the existing empirical literature. Noticeable in the work are pecking order theory and trade-off theory. 
Pecking order theory suggests that: 
 Firms prefer internal finance. 
1. They adapt their target dividend payout ratios to their investment opportunities, although dividends are sticky 
and target payout ratios are only gradually adjusted to shifts in the extent of valuable investment 
opportunities. 
2. Sticky dividend policies, plus unpredictable fluctuations in profitability and investment opportunities, mean 
that internally generated cash-flow may be more or less than investment outlays. If it is less, the firm first 
draws down its cash balance or marketable securities portfolio. 
3. If external finance is required, firms issue the safest security first. That is, they start with dept, then possibly 
hybrid securities such as convertible bonds, then perhaps equity as a last resort. In this story, is no well-
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defined target debt-equity mix, because there are two kinds of equity, internal and external, one at the top of 
the Pecking order and one at the bottom. Each firm’s observed debt ratio reflects its cumulative 
requirements for external finance. 
A firm’s optimal financial mix will involve trade-off among the effects of corporate and personal taxes, 
bankruptcy costs, etc. Agency costs arose from separation of ownership and control and conflicts of interest 
between categories of agents, conflict arise free cash flow conflict between managers and share holders arises 
due to free cash flow. Therefore debt is used as a tool to discipline managers and enhance performance thus 
creating wealth for the equity holders. 
Mangers of firms-quoted and unquoted firms:  
1. Should reduce the amount of debt in their financial structure especially where there are signs of financial 
deterioration which is usually associated with high cost of debt. This will enhance profitability and 
sustenance of operations. 
2. The use of debt should be contingent upon the size and growth of the firm. 
3. Increase debt in the financial structure of firms when profits are high; cost of equity capital are high and 
benefits of tax shield are high. 
4. Use long-term debts to finance fixed tangible assets while short-term debts should be used to finance short-
term obligations. 
5. Should incorporate risk in their profit planning or capital budgeting since business firms operate in 
volatile environment. 
6. Should apply the Pecking Order theory of utilising internally generated funds (retained earnings), 
followed by debt issue where there exist growth opportunities, and later equity issues.  
7. Government policies should be directed at improving the information environment for Nigerian firms since 
information asymmetry influences a firm’s choice of debt financing. 
8. Subsidising floatation cost and reducing listing requirements to encourage small firms gain access to the 
capital market. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Group Descriptive Statistics: Common Sample 
 FSR 
 
TAN PRE GRE OPR FST 
 Mean  14.20204 
 
 20.14181  6.319171  6.483036  3.023029  158.8722 
 Median  10.44505 
 
 19.88055  6.271600  6.469900  2.701900  155.4998 
 Maximum  69.03190 
 
 36.09740  12.36510  9.632100  9.525500  172.6807 
 Minimum  5.320000 
 
 10.67900  2.149400  2.076000 -8.121200  144.1367 
 Std. Dev.  16.18013 
 
 8.153175  2.366234  2.036693  4.333201  10.41896 
Skewness  3.050777 
 
 0.436384  0.855083 -0.460017 -1.098514  0.124673 
 Kurtosis  10.95225  2.007741  4.460918  2.716567  4.369712  1.352755 
 
      
Jarque-Bera  58.60591 
 
 1.018677  2.951055  0.540631  3.910106  1.619093 
 Probability  0.000000  0.600893  0.228658  0.763139  0.141557  0.445060 
 
      
 Observations 14 14 14 14 14 14 
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Hodrick-Prescot trend for OPR 
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